Abstract: This paper presents a general model for the formulation and solution of the risksensitive dynamic decision problem that maximizes the certain equivalent of the discounted rewards of a time-varying Markov decision process. The problem is solved by applying the principle of optimality and stochastic dynamic programming to the immediate rewards and the certain equivalent associated with the remaining transitions of a time-varying Markov process over a finite or infinite time horizon, under the assumptions of constant risk aversion and discounting of future cash flows. The solution provides transient and stationary optimal decision policies which depend on the presence or absence of discounting. The construction equipment replacement problem serves as an example application of the model to illustrate the solution methodology, and the sensitivity of the optimal policy to the discount factor and the degree of risk aversion.
Introduction
Many construction management decisions are dynamic in nature and must be re-evaluated over time based on the current state of some crucial underlying factor, such as the state of company finances, the foreign exchange rate, the current market penetration, the current outlook for the type and number of available future projects, the cost and schedule status of a project, the age and mix of the available spread of equipment, etc.
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Note. This manuscript was published in the ASCE Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, Vol. 115, No. 2, June 1989, pp. 237-257. Paper No. 23553. particularly well suited for addressing dynamic situations that are characterized by uncertainty and risk sensitivity, and which involve a large number of decision alternatives over an extended period of time. The notable exception is the model for analyzing risk-sensitive Markov decision processes proposed by Howard (1972) . This model, however, is also limited because it ignores the importance of discounting future cash flows, a fact that may be crucial in determining optimal decision policies over time. This paper extends Howard's model and presents a general framework for the formulation and solution of the risk-sensitive dynamic decision problem that maximizes the certain equivalent of the discounted rewards of a time-varying Markov decision process. An example application of the model to the construction equipment replacement problem illustrates the effects of discounting and risk aversion.
Risk Preference
The development of the model is based on the assumption that the decision maker's behavior, when faced with an uncertain proposition, can be described by a utility curve u.v/ that assigns a real number u (in an ordinal scale) to each of the possible outcomes v. The technical term for an uncertain proposition is "lottery." If the decision maker accepts the axioms of utility theory, then his preference in ranking alternative lotteries with uncertain outcomes can be quantified by the expected utility EOEu.v/ of each lottery (Luce 1957) . If larger values of v are preferred, then u.v/ is a monotonically increasing function of v. Whenever the decision maker has to chose between several lotteries, the one with the largest EOEu.v/ represents the most desirable alternative.
The certain equivalent of a lottery, Q v, is defined to be that value of the outcome which has the same utility as the expected utility of the lottery.
By definition, the decision maker is indifferent between facing the uncertain outcomes of the lottery and receiving the certain equivalent. For this reason, the certain equivalent is also called the "selling price" of the lottery. It must be pointed out that the "selling price" of a lottery is a technical term that should be interpreted algebraically. For example, the certain equivalent for a lottery that involves monetary losses is negative, and represents the amount of money the decision maker is willing to "pay" in order to sell the risk of the lottery to some other party.
The risk premium v p of a lottery represents the difference between the expected value of the outcomes and the certain equivalent:
For example, the risk premium for a lottery involving monetary losses is the amount that the decision maker is willing to pay in excess of the expected loss in order to avoid facing the risk of the lottery.
The second assumption of the proposed model is that the decision maker is willing to accept what is known as "the delta property": if all the outcomes of a lottery are increased (decreased) by a constant amount , then the certain equivalent of the lottery is also increased (decreased) by :
The principal implication of the delta property is that the certain equivalent of a lottery is independent of the decision maker's present asset position (or wealth). Consequently, if the decision maker is involved in a series of lotteries, then at any stage in this process the certain equivalent for the remaining lotteries does not depend on the specific outcomes of the previous lotteries. The reason for this is that the change in the decision maker's wealth as a result of the outcomes of the first set of lotteries can simply be added to the certain equivalent for the second. Furthermore, if the series of lotteries are independent then the certain equivalent for the combination of sequential independent lotteries equals the sum of the expected equivalents of the lotteries when each is considered separately.
It is easy to prove that the utility function of a decision maker who accepts the delta property must be either linear or exponential (Raiffa 1968 , Howard 1977 . A linear utility function means that the decision maker is "risk-neutral". Such as person makes decisions by comparing the expected value of the outcomes of each possible alternative. The exponential utility function defines the case of "constant risk aversion" where the risk premium of a lottery does not change if all the outcomes of the lottery are increased by the same amount. The exponential utility function includes the linear case and its functional form can, in general, be written as follows:
Its inverse is given by:
The parameter is the "risk aversion coefficient" and .sgn / is the sign of . A positive indicates that the decision maker is risk averse: the certain equivalent of a lottery is smaller than the expected value of the outcomes, and thus, the risk premium for the lottery is positive. A negative indicates that the decision maker prefers risk, the opposite situation. In the limit, as approaches zero, the behavior implied by the exponential function tends to be risk neutral, the same as for a linear utility curve.
The delta property can now be expressed in terms of utility:
Increasing the outcomes of a lottery by causes their utilities to be multiplied by the same quantity e . As a result, the expected utility of the lottery is also multiplied by e and the certain equivalent Q v is increased by .
Time-Varying Markov Reward Process
The general dynamic decision problem is based on a time-varying, discrete-state, discrete-stage
Markov process with N states in each stage. The process is described by the transition probability matrix P.n/, which, in general, is a function of n, the number of transitions (or stages) to the end of the process. Each element p ij .n/ in this matrix represents the probability that the process will make a transition into state j given that it currently occupies state i with n transitions remaining.
A transition from state i to state j with n transitions remaining is associated with a reward r ij .n/, which can be positive or negative. As a result, the reward matrix R.n/ is also a function of n.
Consider that the process is currently in state i of stage n C 1 (i.e., it has n C 1 transitions remaining). The total value of the reward from the remaining transitions of the process is given by the random variable v i .n C 1/. This random variable represents the outcomes of a complex lottery (event tree) which combines the transition probabilities and outcomes of the nC1 sequential simple lotteries that occur over the remaining n C 1 transitions. Notice that the n C 1 sequential simple lotteries are not independent because the transition probabilities and the reward of each transition depends on the state occupied in the previous stage.
For a decision maker that satisfies the delta property the certain equivalent for the future rewards of this process is independent of the changes in the decision maker's asset position due to the rewards received in previous transitions. The certain equivalent Q v i .nC1/ is the amount the decision maker is willing to take for certain, instead of facing the remaining n C 1 rewards of the process.
Similarly, Q v i .n/ is the certain equivalent with n transitions remaining. The transition from state i in stage n C 1 to state j in stage n will pay an immediate reward r ij .n C 1/ and will lead to a certain equivalent Q v j .n/ for the remaining n transitions. Thus, we can write the recursive relationship (Howard 1972 ):
The term u. Q v i .n C 1// represents the expected utility of the reward process when it currently occupies state i in stage n C 1 (i.e., with n C 1 transitions remaining). Making a transition from state i in stage n C 1 to state j in stage n, leads to a reward r ij .n C 1/ and the prospect of facing n more transitions whose certain equivalent is Q v j .n/. The transition from i to j increases the end values for the remaining n transitions by the constant value r ij .n C 1/. Because of the delta property, the certain equivalent for the prospect of making the next transition into state j and facing the remaining n transitions is given by the sum r ij .n C 1/ C Q v j .n/. As a result, the original multistage process is equivalent to the single-transition process from state i to state j where the rewards are increased to r ij .n C 1/ C Q v j .n/. This equivalence allows the recursive solution of the problem starting at stage 0 and working backwards in time. The certain equivalents Q v j .0/ in stage 0 must be assigned directly by the decision maker.
Time-Varying Markov Reward Process with Discounting
The above formulation is inappropriate for many business problems because it ignores the time value of money. To introduce the concept of discounting future cash flows we need to define two new parameters,˛.n C 1/ andˇ.n C 1/, so that˛.n C 1/r ij .n C 1/ andˇ.n C 1/ Q v j .n/ are the respective present values of r ij .nC1/ and Q v j .n/ at stage nC1. If the reward r ij .nC1/ is paid at the beginning of the time span between stages n C 1 and n, then˛.n C 1/ D 1. Similarly, if the reward r ij .nC1/ is paid at the end of the time span between stages nC1 and n, then˛.nC1/ Dˇ.nC1/.
Thus, parameters˛.n C 1/ andˇ.n C 1/ are discount factors, whereˇ.n C 1/ equals:
The parameter .n C 1/ is the discount rate for the time period from stage n C 1 to stage n. For the ease of notation, and with no loss of generality, we shall assume that the time interval between stages is constant and thus use the simplified notation˛andˇ.
Considering discounting we can now write:
where the certain equivalent Q v i .n C 1/ for the remaining n C 1 transitions is expressed in present value terms in stage n C 1 and the certain equivalents Q v j .n/ are expressed in present value terms in stage n. Substituting the analytical form of the exponential utility function gives:
p ij .n C 1/ OE .sgn / e ˛r ij .nC1/ e ˇQ v j .n/ n D 0; 1; 2; : : :
The utility u.ˇQ v j .n// of the certain equivalent at stage n discounted to stage n C 1 can be computed as follows:
13)
Substituting into the previous equation yields:
This equation can be simplified by observing that:
where u.˛r ij .n C 1// is the utility associated with the present value of the reward of the next transition to state j when currently in state i with n C 1 transitions remaining. The notation is simplified further, if we write the expected utility u. Q v i .n// with n transitions remaining in the process as u i .n/:
This is the fundamental recursive equation that relates the expected utility u i .n C 1/ of state i in stage n C 1 to the expected utility u j .n/ of state j in stage n. The parameters p ij .n C 1/ and r ij .n C 1/ on the right-hand side describe the transition from stage n C 1 to stage n. The effect of these parameters can be summarized by defining q ij .n C 1/ to be equal to the product of the utility of the present value of the immediate reward times the associated transition probability:
Thus, the recursive relationship can be written as:
In matrix form we can write:
It is understood that the exponent on the right-hand side applies to each individual element of the vector OE .sgn / U.n/ and not to the vector itself (the matrix power of a vector does not exist).
In the case of no discounting we have˛DˇD 1 and we can write:
q ij .n C 1/ u j .n/ n D 0; 1; 2; : : :
Using the above equations we can compute the expected utility at any state i and any stage n by starting at stage 0 and continuing backwards in time. At any stage n the certain equivalent of the process can be computed from:
In the case where we only compute and store the discounted form of utilities u.ˇQ v i .n//, we can use the formula:
Stationary Markov Reward Process with Discounting
The classical Markov reward process is a special case of the time-varying process presented above in which the transition probability matrix P, the reward matrix R, and the discount factors˛anď , are the same for all transitions:
n/ Dˇn D 1; 2; : : :
As a result, the matrix Q is also independent of n:
The recursive equations for computing the expected utility u i .n C 1/ associated with state i with n C 1 transitions remaining can be written as follows:
q ij OE .sgn / u j .n/ˇn D 0; 1; 2; : : :
When the matrix Q is not a function of time, the Markov reward process exhibits stationary behavior for large n. As the number of remaining transitions n increases, the expected utility u i .n/ and the certain equivalent Q v i .n/ associated each state i approach stationary (limiting) values u i and Q v i . The stationary (limiting) certain equivalent Q v i for each state i is analogous to the finite present value of a discounted perpetuity. The cause of this stationary behavior is the fact that the utility contribution of future rewards is discounted over time and approaches zero as the interval from the present stage to the future reward becomes very large. This, of course, is true forˇ< 1.
The computation of the stationary certain equivalents Q v i is of particular interest for ongoing processes that are not expected to end in the near future. The Q v i can be computed by repeatedly applying the above recursive equations until the change in expected utilities or certain equivalents from stage n to stage nC1 are small enough to be considered insignificant. Obviously, the assumed values for Q v i .0/ or u i .0/ influence the number of iterations needed for convergence. Any choice of starting values, however, will lead to the same stationary values Q v i and u i because their contribution will eventually become zero.
Alternatively, the stationary values can be computed directly by solving the following set of N nonlinear simultaneous equations:
q ij OE .sgn / u j ˇi D 1; 2; : : : ; N
or, in matrix form:
Indeed, the recursive equations (27) represent a simple algorithm for the numerical solution of the above nonlinear set of stationary equations.
Stationary Markov Reward Process without Discounting
In the case where the discount rate is zero (i.e.ˇD 1), the process assumes a slightly different behavior for large n. Since future rewards are not discounted, their contribution to expected utility does not depend on when the reward is received. Thus, the expected utility for each state of the process may not converge to a finite value. For example, the expected utilities u i .n/ for a process in which the all the transition rewards represent profit increase indefinitely as the number of remaining transitions n becomes very large. As a result, lim n!1 Q v i .n/ D 1 (i D 1; 2; : : : ; N ). The limiting behavior, in this case, is reflected in the way the expected utilities and certain equivalents change from stage to stage.
For the nondiscounted Markov reward process to exhibit stationary behavior the transition probability matrix P must satisfy the following two conditions (Howard 1972) : (1) If these two conditions are satisfied, then for large n:
This means that, for large n, the expected utility of state i will be multiplied by a constant at each preceding stage. The constant multiplier is the same for all states i.
Using this relationship and the recursive equations (27) leads to the following eigenvalue problem (system of N linear equations):
Under the two conditions posed above, it can be proven that the constant exists and is a positive real number equal to the largest eigenvalue of the matrix .sgn / Q. The corresponding eigenvector U is the vector of relative expected utilities. Solving the eigenvalue problem is a computational alternative to the repeated application of the recursive equations (27), which allows the direct determination of and the relative expected utilities u i for each state i. The values u i are relative because for any constant c the vector cU will also satisfy the eigenvalue equations. As a result, we must assign an arbitrary value to the expected utility of one of the states i in order to compute the other N 1 relative expected utilities. A convenient assignment is u N D .sgn / because it simplifies the interpretation of relative certain equivalents as explained below.
The stationary behavior of certain equivalents can be determined by substituting the explicit form of the exponential utility curve into equation (30):
Thus, for large n, the certain equivalent for state i increases by a constant Q g at each preceding
stage. The constant Q g is called the "certain equivalent gain" of the process and is the same for all states i.
Because the certain equivalent gain Q g is the same for all states i, it follows that the difference
n/ between the certain equivalents of any two states i and j in the same stage, will also approach a limiting value Q v i Q v j as n becomes very large. The limiting Q v i and Q v j are computed from the relative expected utilities u i and u j , and thus their values depend on the arbitrarily chosen value for u N . As pointed out above, a convenient value is u N D .sgn /, which implies that
As a result, the computed limiting certain equivalents Q v i are "relative" to Q v N .n/. In other words, they represent the following limit:
This means that the relative certain equivalent Q v i expresses the difference in value that the decision maker attributes to being in state i, as opposed to state N , with an infinite number of transitions remaining.
Time-Varying Markov Decision Process
The reward processes presented above have been based on the implicit assumption that the decision maker does not have any control over the transition and reward matrices P.n/ and R.n/. Let us now consider the decision process where the decision maker can influence the transition probabilities and future rewards of the process by selecting an alternative from a set of possible actions at each state and stage. Alternative action k is associated with its own transition matrix P k .n/ and reward matrix R k .n/. Thus, in any state i of stage n the decision maker has to decide whether to adopt alternative k, which in turn determines the p k ij .n/ and r k ij .n/ for the next transition. The number of possible alternative actions in each state i may be different from the number of alternatives for some other state j , and may also vary from stage to stage as a function of the remaining transitions n. Furthermore, the nature of the alternatives can also vary from state to state and from stage to stage. For example, the alternatives might be whether to conduct a marketing study looking at new business areas in the case of a decline in the decision maker's current market, or whether to expand in new geographical regions if the demand for the decision maker's specialty is on the rise. From this definition it is clear that the generalized time-varying Markov decision process has the structure of a decision tree where the probabilities of chance nodes and the associated rewards are conditional on which alternative action is taken.
The problem is to find the optimal decision policy that will produce the maximum expected utility u i .n/ for the rewards generated by the remaining n transitions of the process. An optimal policy would indicate the optimal alternative action k that should be chosen for a particular combination of state i and stage n. To facilitate the notation we will assign a number k D 1; 2; : : : ; to each of the possible alternative actions in each state, and let d i .n/ be the number of the optimum alternative k that we should follow when the process is in state i with n transitions remaining.
Thus, the optimal policy is established, and the problem is solved, when we have determined the N values of the column vector D.n/ for every n.
The procedure for solving this problem is recursive and is based on stochastic dynamic programming. Given that we know the optimal policies for stages 1; 2; : : : ; n; and thus the maximum expected utilities u j .n/ at stage n, the maximum expected utility u i .n C 1/ and the optimal policy d i .n C 1/ for state i at stage n C 1 can be computed by using the principle of optimality:
.nC1/ OE .sgn /OE .sgn / u j .n/ˇn D 0; 1; 2; : : :
Thus, for each state i in stage n C 1 we search for the alternative k that maximizes the expected utility u i .n C 1/ of the future rewards. The alternative k that maximizes u i .n C 1/ is the optimal policy d i .n C 1/. We can determine the N values of the vector D.n C 1/ by repeating this process over all states i. Once the vector D.n C 1/ has been established, we can repeat the process to compute D.n C 2/, etc. Using this method, the problem is solved backwards, starting at the end of the process (stage 0) and solving the decision problem in stage 1, stage 2, etc.
Example: The Equipment Replacement Problem
To illustrate the application of this model to a construction problem we shall examine the replacement problem for construction equipment -in this case, a scraper. The example is adapted from (Howard 1960 ) and can be easily modified and extended for other types of equipment. This application will provide additional insight into the effects of risk aversion and the discount factor on the development of an optimal policy.
The problem is whether to keep an existing scraper, or whether to trade it in and buy another one, and if so, to determine how old the replacement should be. We will assume that these decisions have to be made every 3 months. The data for this problem are shown in Table 1 and plotted in Fig. 1 . They are defined as follows:
C i = The cost of buying a scraper of age i.
T i = The trade-in value (salvage value) of a scraper of age i.
E i = The expected cost of operating a scraper of age i until it reaches age i C 1. (Reductions in productivity that may occur because of age can be modeled by an appropriate increase in operating costs.)
p i = The probability that a scraper of age i will survive to reach age i C 1 without incurring a prohibitively expensive repair. 
Problem Formulation
From the above data we can compute the probability transition matrices and the reward matrices for the different decision alternatives.
For k D 0; 1; 2; : : : ; 39 (trade-in for a 3k-month-old scraper):
For k D 40 (keep existing scraper for another 3 months):
The recursive equations for solving the problem can now be written as follows: 
Solution Methodology
Probably the easiest and most accessible method for solving the problem is to program these equa- The 1640 formulas for the alternative-state combinations in stage nC1 are, of course, a function of the maximum expected utilities u j .n/ in stage n. Since the u j .n/ are common input to all 1640 formulas they are stored to the left of the 40 cells used for storing u i .n C 1/. Between the two columns for u j .n/ and u i .n C 1/ there is one more column that computes which alternative k produces the maximum u i .n C 1/. Thus, the 40 cells in this column contain the optimal policies d i .n C 1/ for the corresponding states i. To perform iteration over stages we need a simple program (macro) that copies the values (not the formulas) of u i .n C 1/ into the cells for u i .n/ and recalculates the worksheet. The 40 cells that contained u i .n/ now hold the values u i .n C 1/ and the columns d i .n C 1/ and u i .n C 1/ now show the solution for d i .n C 2/ and u i .n C 2/. By repeating this process we can solve the problem for any number of stages. Obviously, in order to start the iteration process we have to initially define u i .0/ in the u i .n/ column. For this example, the values u i .0/ were computed from the certain equivalents Q v i .0/ which were set equal to the corresponding trade-in values T i . In other words, at the end of the process the scraper is no longer needed and it is sold.
The optimal policies determined by this approach are a function of the risk aversion coefficient and the discount factorˇ. Sensitivity analysis over these parameters can be performed by changing these parameters and resolving the problem for the optimal policies. A similar sensitivity analysis can be performed for all the cost and probability data shown in Table 1 .
Interpretation of the Results
This problem has been solved forˇD 1 (no discounting),ˇD 0:97 (annual discount rate The decision policy for an infinite number of remaining transitions is to keep the current scraper if it is between 2.25 and 7.5 years old and to trade it for a 4-year-old otherwise. This means that a company following this policy will always own a scraper that is between 4 and 7.5 years old.
Furthermore, it is possible to sell to this company a special lease (or the rights) to use a cost-free scraper between these ages for a lump sum amount equal to the certain equivalent corresponding to the age of the scraper it currently owns. For example, if the company currently owns a 5-yearold scraper, it should be indifferent between following this policy and paying a one-time fee of $545,581 for the right to use a scraper between 4 and 7.5 years old over an infinite time horizon without incurring any additional ownership and operating costs.
The stationary optimal certain equivalents and the corresponding policies forˇD 0:97 anď D 0:95 are shown in Tables 2 and 3 , and are plotted in Fig. 3 and 4 for various risk aversion coefficients ranging from -0.001 (gambling behavior) to 0.0005 (risk averse behavior). The values for D 0 indicate the optimal policies for risk neutral behavior. Notice that as decreases, the implied behavior is less risk averse, and that the optimal policies involve trade-ins for newer equipment. The opposite is true for large values of . In the extreme, when D 0:0005, the optimal policy includes keeping a 10-year-old (worn out) scraper. As a result, a company following this policy will eventually end up with a 10-year-old scraper that will be kept forever at a high operating cost of $25,000 every three months. The certain equivalent in this case equals the net present value of a discounted perpetuity, a fact easily verified from the given data. For example, forˇD 0:97 we have Q v 40 D $25; 000=.1 0:97/ D $833; 333 (Fig. 3) . Table 4 shows the optimal policies forˇD 1 (no discounting) and various degrees of risk aversion. Notice that since there is no discounting, the notion of present value is substituted by the notion of the certain equivalent gain Q g, which represents the cost of owning and operating a scraper over a 3-month period for a company that follows the optimal policy. Fig. 5 shows how the certain equivalent gain Q g varies as a function of the risk aversion coefficient . Obviously, the limit for Q g as increases is E 40 D $25; 000.
The certain equivalents Q v i forˇD 1 are relative to Q v 40 which was set to $0. If we increase represent the dollar value of owning a scraper in state i to a company that follows the corresponding optimal policy. If the optimal policy for state i is to replace the existing scraper, the adjusted Q v i equals the trade-in value T i . In other words, the market value of the scraper is more than the value that the company attributes to it, and as a result, the optimal decision is to sell the existing machine and replace it with another one.
To interpret the optimal policy of keeping the existing scraper let us consider a company that follows the optimal policy for D 0:00005, and which currently owns a 5-year-old scraper (i D 20). The value of this scraper to the company is $25,696 more than the value of a 10-year-old (which has a trade-in value of $8,000): $25; 696 C $8; 000 D $33; 696. This is more than its trade-in value T 20 D $25; 500, but less than its purchase cost C 20 D $36; 000. Thus, the company would prefer to keep a 5-year-old scraper rather than to trade it in, but it would not buy it as a replacement for another machine. This, of course, is true for all states i for which the optimal policy is to keep the current scraper. The only exception occurs for i D 16 which is the age of the replacement scraper under the optimal policy.
A 4-year-old scraper (i D 16) has a relative value Q v 16 D $36; 000, which when adjusted by $8,000 equals its purchase cost C 16 D $44; 000. If we examine the difference between the adjusted value Q v i C $8000 and the purchase cost C i for all states i we see that it is always negative except when i D 16 in which case it is $0. This, of course, is the expected equilibrium condition.
The value that the company attributes to the age (state) of the replacement scraper must be the maximum over all other states and it must equal its purchase price, otherwise, the company would not buy it. It is interesting to notice that the optimal age for the replacement scraper does not depend on the age of the machine being traded. This is as expected given the logic of the situation. This amount is equivalent to a perpetuity of $545; 581=.1 0:97/ D $16; 367, payable every 3 months beginning immediately. This perpetuity represents the equivalent cost of owning and operating a scraper under the optimal policy given the age of the existing equipment, and is analogous to the certain equivalent gain Q g D $16; 551 which applies forˇD 1 (no discounting). Notice, however, that because future costs are discounted, the value of the perpetuity depends on the age of the existing scraper, whereas the certain equivalent gain Q g is the same for all states (when future costs are not discounted, it makes no difference when the transitions implied by the stationary decision policy occur).
The amount Q v 20 Q v 40 C T 40 D $545; 581 C $572; 130 C $8; 000 D $34; 549 represents the adjusted relative certain equivalent for a 5-year-old scraper. This represents the scraper's present value to the company, and since the optimal policy is to keep it, this value is between T 20 D $25; 500 and C 20 D $36; 000. For all states i for which the optimal policy is to replace the existing equipment, the adjusted relative certain equivalent equals the trade-in value T i .
For state i D 16, the age of the replacement scraper, the adjusted relative certain equivalent is $536; 130 C $572; 130 C $8; 000 D $44; 000 which equals the replacement cost C 16 . Thus, the proper interpretation of the results with and without discounting is exactly the same.
A comparison of Fig. 3 and 4, and Tables 2, 3 , 4, shows that the optimal decision policies and the especially the values of the stationary certain equivalents depend on the adopted discount rate and the degree of risk aversion exhibited by the decision maker. For a given , the effect of a higher discount rate is to decrease the number of states for which the existing scraper is worth keeping and to increase the optimal age for the replacement scraper. Thus, higher discount rates produce the same qualitative effect as higher degrees of risk aversion. The stationary certain equivalents depend primarily on the discount rate whereas the optimal replacement policy is more sensitive to the risk aversion coefficient. This phenomenon is apparent in almost all management problems.
Conclusion
The model presented in this article is a powerful tool for the analysis of many construction management decision problems that exhibit dynamic behavior over time. Its ability to encompass risk aversion and discounting of future cash flows makes it particularly useful for financial problems at the strategic and operations management levels. Obviously, it can also be used to tackle simplified dynamic decision problems where discounting or risk aversion are not particularly important.
It is interesting to notice that the same model can be applied to problems whose stages extend over space and not over time. An example would be the determination of an optimal excavation and support sequence in tunneling. By utilizing a probabilistic geologic prediction model that reflects all available information about the project geology (Ioannou 1984 (Ioannou , 1987 , it is possible to subdivide the project's horizontal alignment into segments (stages), and to construct the spacevarying Markov transition probability matrix P.n/ from each geologic state i in segment n to any other possible state j in the next segment n 1. The length of each segment could be as short as the length of each round. The decision alternatives in each stage would be the particular excavation and support methods that would be used in the corresponding segment. Obviously, the choice of a particular excavation-support combination affects the cost of constructing the segment (the reward matrix R.n/) but does not influence the transition probabilities since those are a function of geologic information. This problem also requires that the reward structure of the model be modified to account for the fixed costs of switching to new construction methods.
Tunneling decisions in practice are characterized by a considerable amount of conservatism that depends on the amount of available geologic information and the amount of risk born by each party to the contract (Ioannou 1984) . Even though a stochastic dynamic programming approach to the tunneling problem has already been attempted (Kim 1984) p ij .n/ = Markov transition probability for the transition from state i in stage n to state j in stage n 1. p k ij .n/ = Markov transition probability for the transition from state i in stage n to state j in stage n 1, given decision alternative k.
q ij .n/ = Product of the Markov transition probability p ij .n/ times the associated utility of the discounted reward˛.n/r ij .n/.
.n/ = The discount rate for the time period between stage n and stage n 1.
r ij .n/ = Reward associated with the transition from state i in stage n to state j in stage n 1. 
